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Exploring Entrepreneurial Legitimacy in Reward-Based Crowdfunding 
 
Venture financing through social networks has become a global phenomenon. The 
processes and drivers of crowdfunding require careful study to identify similarities and 
distinctions from traditional venture finance. The demonstration of project legitimacy is 
especially interesting, because online crowdfunding limits investors’ access to the 
entrepreneur and organisation. How do rewards-based crowdfunding projects establish 
and demonstrate legitimacy in this virtual, impersonal context? We employ a novel 
dataset collected from the Kickstarter crowdfunding platform to explore the 
characteristics of successful projects, including legitimating signals and content. The 
data reveals numerous findings linking project characteristics to legitimacy and success. 
First, lower funding targets and shorter duration signal legitimacy by setting modest, 
achievable expectations. Rewards structures, like traditional equity investment terms, 
appear to generate a sense of legitimate investment returns. Finally, narrative legitimacy 
in the online crowdfunding context may derive more from the online platform 
community than the visual pitch. Our study reveals a more nuanced picture of 
legitimacy-formation during rewards-based crowdfunding, with implications for 
theories of resource assembly and the practice of venture finance. 
 
Keywords: crowdfunding, organisational legitimacy, entrepreneurial legitimacy, resource 
assembly, venture capital 
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1 Introduction 
Early stage venture funding is difficult.  Accelerating rates of innovation and market 
adoption increase the attractiveness of distributed online financing for new ventures.  
Although online social networking emerged as a consumer-driven service, entrepreneurs 
have now begun to exploit formal and informal networks for capital assembly. 
Crowdfunding, a form of crowdsourced venture funding, is an online ecosystem 
experiencing rapid growth. Resource deficient entrepreneurs utilise crowdfunding as an 
innovative capital management mechanism to bypass early-stage capital gaps by  
pre-funding production and sales (Harrison 2013).  Entrepreneurs target “amateurs” or 
affinity-based consumers to pre-finance a service or product, rather than pitch 
professional investors.  Crowdfunding helps entrepreneurs and investors reduce the risk 
of underfunding a project, since investments are not executed unless the minimum 
funding amount is met. 
Crowdfunding may facilitate legitimacy development for nascent ventures.  The 
market-facing funding approach offers entrepreneurs a “tailor-made” solution to 
assemble and allocate finance (Belleflamme et al. 2013).  Crowdfunding engages 
prospective customers and investors in the funding, (pre-) launch, or growth of 
entrepreneurial projects and firms (Burtch et al. 2011; Mollick 2014).  Entrepreneurs 
can establish strong networks in the market and utilise traction from the distributed 
group of individuals to increase organisational legitimacy and facilitate financial capital 
assembly.  
As Reuber and Fischer (2011) note, online reputation and brand communities 
support entrepreneurial activities in internet-enabled markets by attracting investors: the 
firm’s reputation with customers is co-created with legitimacy in an online environment.  
Online brand communities may confer market validity, encouraging investors and 
customers to engage with an entrepreneurial venture.  Crowdfunding enables 
entrepreneurs to create, develop and foster online reputation and community using  
social-psychological incentives (Lehner 2013).  Some entrepreneurs exploit these 
heterogeneous communities to mobilize socially embedded financial capital. 
Legitimacy may be an important driver of financial resource assembly for these 
ventures (Mollick 2013).  As crowdfunding is a recent phenomenon, our understanding 
of the drivers of legitimacy during crowdfunding and venture development has not been 
investigated.  This study explores (1) how entrepreneurs facilitate organisational 
legitimacy creation during crowdfunding, and (2) how the process affects the financial 
outcome in reward-based crowdfunding.  We discuss how entrepreneurs promote 
legitimacy through specific crowdfunding features.  Our study reveals some of the 
narrative processes that entrepreneurs deploy to establish legitimacy in  
reward-based crowdfunding. 
2 Research Motivation 
2.1 Crowdfunding practice 
The fundamental concept of crowdfunding – assembling financial capital from social 
networks – is not new.  Historical examples of crowdfunding include the (family) 
partnership system in the late middle age (Lane 1944), charitable fundraising (Bremner 
1996; Ingenhoff and Koelling 2009) and microfinance (Morduch 1999).  However, 
recent developments in information and communication technology (ICT) facilitate the 
development and professionalization of crowdfunding via distributed, open access, 
online systems.  Specialised online crowdfunding platforms are at ‘the heart of 
crowdfunding [and] drive the implementation of the crowdfunding model’ (Ingram et al. 
2013, 1). 
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Crowdfunding platforms are developing into capital intermediates (Harrison 2013; 
Lehner 2013).  There were more than 800 active online crowdfunding platforms in 
2012, listing over 1.1 million crowdfunding projects and invested capital of US$2.7 
billion (Massolution 2013).  Kickstarter surpassed US$1 billion in funded projects in 
early 2014; crowdfunding’s growth may ultimately impact the traditional venture capital 
market.  The rapid growth of crowdfunding justifies research to better understand 
similarities and distinctions from traditional venture finance. 
2.2 Crowdfunding theory 
Nascent entrepreneurs and de novo firms face the disadvantage of small size and limited 
access to resources.  Some entrepreneurs overcome the ‘liability of newness’  
(Stinchombe 1965) through a series of techniques and actions to facilitate resource 
assembly (Hitt et al. 2011; Ciabuschi et al. 2012).  It is unclear whether innovative ICT 
platforms are simply another tool in the entrepreneur’s resource assembly toolkit, or an 
entirely distinct mechanism for capital formation processes.  Rewards-based 
crowdfunding presents additional challenges to the traditional model, because it may 
represent a mechanism for generating “pre-production sales,” reducing or eliminating 
the venture’s initial working capital deficit. 
Crowdfunding takes traditional “offline” business processes into an online 
environment, enabling entrepreneurs to nurture and facilitate business development.  
Features such as online-based communities and interaction mechanisms generate new 
settings for capital assembly, suggesting the potential for distinctive or novel 
entrepreneurial processes and potentially different success drivers.  The use of ICT-
enabled tools may also introduce different investment dynamics effecting processes and 
activities associated with organisational legitimacy creation and resource assembly. 
The links between venture creation, resource assembly, and crowdfunding 
processes merit careful investigation.  Crowdfunding, including rewards-based 
crowdfunding, may require new theories of resource assembly and venture 
heterogeneity.  The drivers, processes, and outcomes of venture capital activity may not 
be entirely applicable in the context of crowdsourced finance. 
3 Literature Review 
Crowdfunding represents an apparently novel platform for early stage capital assembly. 
Its underlying practices and mechanisms have been examined in various literatures, 
including the resource-based view, social network theory, and micro-economic pricing 
models.  We examine the characteristics of crowdfunding through the lens of prior 
research to specify novel aspects and potential deviations from prior research. 
3.1 Crowdfunding as transaction mechanism 
Four models of crowdfunding have been observed: donation, reward, lending, and 
equity-based.  All rely on the crowdsourcing mechanism to obtain capital from a 
previously distributed and heterogeneous group (the crowd) who provide the capital 
injection in exchange for tangible or intangible returns. 
Mollick (2014) argues that the difference between crowdfunding models lies in the 
goals of the entrepreneurs and supporters.  Equity and lending based models rely on 
relatively traditional investment mechanisms.  Lending-based model link founders and 
supporters in a debtor and lender relationship, and the equity-based model (similar to 
traditional venture capital) creating an entrepreneur-investor relationship.  In donation-
based models, project creators are social entrepreneurs while supporters serve as 
philanthropists.  In the case of reward-based crowdfunding, the predominant online 
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model, entrepreneurs are characterized as “creators” or “project founders” and project 
supporters represent early customers or co-creators rather than investors. 
The donation-based crowdfunding model is relatively well-aligned with models of 
social entrepreneurship (Lehner 2013).  The other three models align more closely with 
traditional venture capital, since they assembly risk capital for entrepreneurial activities 
(Mollick 2013).  Reward, lending, and equity-crowdfunding models feature a tangible 
or monetary exchange.  This creates contractual relationships and instruments between 
the entrepreneur and stakeholders comparable to those in traditional venture capital.  
(Ley and Weaven 2011; Agrawal et al. 2011).  Crowdfunding also provides an 
ecosystem facilitating broader resource exchange between stakeholders (Lambert and 
Schwienbacher 2010).  This potentially facilitates the collective development of a 
business plan or other knowledge exchange not found in venture capital, which judges 
rather than co-creates the business plan.  Crowdfunding participants may be able to use 
these ecosystems to increase market awareness and receive customer feedback. 
Crowdfunding may be understood as a product pre-ordering model that enables 
price discrimination among early adopters (Belleflamme et al. 2013). For example, 
reward-based crowdfunding projects commonly have pre-order mechanisms integrated 
into their reward-structure (e.g. invest US$10 to a music project and receive the 
recorded music album once it is completed). This presents a zero-cost capital 
management technique to fuel organic growth in early business stages (Vanacker and 
Manigart 2010; McKelvie and Wiklund 2010). 
Crowdfunding may also facilitate investment based on alternative investor utility 
factors, including social good or other non-fiduciary values (Lehner 2013).  From this 
standpoint, legitimacy incorporates social and business goals in investors’ evaluations.  
In this case, social and psychological factors may be equally or more important than 
strictly financial returns.  This suggests that narrative may play a significant role in 
successful crowdfunding activities by establishing a convincing and compelling 
investment story distinct from the novel product or service attributes  
(Lounsbury and Glynn 2001).  
Crowdfunding is an inherently distributed and socially-embedded process.  Equity- 
and lending-based crowdfunding activities may incorporate significantly more social 
and psychological processes than observed in traditional venture capital (Mollick 2014).  
Although equity-crowdfunding is financially driven, investors might obtain utility from 
the excitement or sense of community associated with the process itself.  This is 
supported by the characteristics of some equity-crowdfunding contracts, which are 
generally long-term and non-voting equity investment contracts (e.g. 10 years) without 
dividends. 
3.2 Crowdfunding as social exchange 
Social dynamics are fundamental features in the crowdfunding ecosystem, which is 
constructed around the relationships in heterogeneous social networks.  Crowdfunding 
is intended to leverage the “wisdom of the crowd,” (Surowiecki 2004), but 
entrepreneurs must identify or create a suitable community accessible via the online 
platform (Belaflamme et al. 2013).  Peer-effects are important in these communities 
since membership and communications are publicly observable and likely to influence 
individual decisions and pitch outcomes as Ward and Ramachandran (2010) 
demonstrate.  The development of social interactions surrounding a given project, and 
the nature of the development process itself, may be critical to the outcome of the 
crowdfunding effort (Burtch et al. 2011).  The demonstrated interest and positive 
conversation about a given project may be drivers of project legitimacy – supporting 
some projects just enough but others not at all (Burtch et al. 2011; Zhang and Liu 2012) 
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Resource assembly through traditional venture capital tends to be geographically 
contingent (Rocha 2004; Harrison et al. 2010).  By contrast, crowdfunding may 
facilitate resource assembly that is independent of geography.  Although ICT reduces a 
variety of business barriers (Anderson 2004), there is some evidence that offline social 
relationships and perceptions of trust may not be easy to entirely virtualize.  We cannot 
expect new business models or wider broadband to eradicate cultural and institutional 
boundaries and geographically de-structure investment clusters.  We agree with Mollick 
(2014) and Agrawal et al. (2011) who argue that space continue to matter and offline 
social relationships and perceptions of trust continue to shape patterns of crowdfunding 
interactivity: the potential of crowdfunding to overcome long-distance investment 
barriers is limited.  Nor is crowdfunding likely to globalise attitudes towards risk-taking 
in science-based ventures, since crowdfunding investors bring to sites their inherited 
predilections and habituations.  International patterning of technology-based firm 
investments is likely to persist for some time, despite the access opportunities 
crowdfunding sites create.  Moreover, we expect urban clusters of particular 
technologies (software or games in San Francisco, apps in Bangalore) to continue 
providing new business pitches and investors from amongst offline communities with 
pre-understanding of the technology. 
3.3 Crowdfunding as legitimacy building 
Organisational legitimacy helps explain why some nascent entrepreneurial activities 
develop into successful firms and others do not (Suchman 1995).  Indeed, Ahlstrom and 
Bruton (2002) found that organisational legitimacy may be understood as a resource, as 
well as a signal for resource assembly in entrepreneurial processes and activities.  The 
lack of organisational legitimacy restricts access to prospective resource holders and 
hinders early-stage development (Alvarez and Busenitz 2001; Tornikoski and Newbert 
2007).  Establishing legitimacy may facilitate faster and efficient capital acquisition 
(Lounsbury and Glynn 2001).  Legitimacy and resource assembly are likely co-created 
during organizational development (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). Legitimacy gives 
ventures access to external stakeholders and is associated with inflow of exogenous 
resources (Mason and Harrison 2000; Chen et al. 2009). 
Organizational legitimacy is associated with a variety of individual and firm-level 
characteristics.  These include founder education level and experience as well as the 
heterogeneity of the entrepreneurial team (Cohen and Dean 2005; Packalen 2007; 
Balboa and Marti 2007; Zimmerman 2008; Dalziel et al. 2011).  Firms may 
institutionalize entrepreneurial narrative into artefacts or market-facing documents to 
communicate internally-generated legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol 1994); Delmar and 
Shane 2004).  Firms may seek conferral of legitimacy from external sources through 
certifications or authorizations (Rao 1994; Sorescu et al. 2007).  Some ventures seek 
legitimization by communicating projections of the firm’s intended operational or 
commercial pathway (Baron and Markman 2003; Anderson 2005).  Legitimacy may be 
primarily conferred through intangible and socially-centred resources precisely because 
the firm has no financial history, operations, or assets that may be rationally valued 
(Khaire 2010). 
It is possible that online crowdfunding platforms play to the strengths of new 
venture legitimization.  The lack of assets or operations is not a hindrance to 
establishing a positive reputation in a fully virtualized context.  Crowdfunding 
participants may have little or no expectation for physical demonstrations of venture 
viability, precisely because the media establishes a level playing field in which 
reputation may be the  
primary currency.  
7 
The evidence, however, suggests that legitimacy is not easily obtained during 
crowdfunding.  Mollick’s (2014) study reports that unsuccessful projects fail their 
funding target by large amounts while successful projects exceed their targets by small 
amounts.  This suggests that project legitimacy is relatively difficult to achieve.  
Projects that do achieve legitimacy do not generally benefit from a “tipping point” 
model of broad acceptance.  
3.4 The role of narrative in establishing crowdfunding legitimacy 
Cultural entrepreneurship theory emphasises that the subjective perception of the firm to 
external agents, regardless of the objective value of the firm’s resource stock, may be 
essential to legitimization and ultimate resource assembly (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001).  
This contrasts with bounded rationality approaches to venture capital investment that 
rely on models of risk minimization and management (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).  
When risks are not easily quantified at new ventures, ‘stories can provide needed 
accounts that explain, rationalize, and promote a new venture to reduce the uncertainty 
typically associated with entrepreneurship’ (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001, 546).   
Research suggests that effective storytelling is essential to establishing firm 
legitimacy and acquiring capital (Roddick 2000; O’Connor 2004). By packaging the 
firm’s intangible and tangible resources into a meaningful bundle, entrepreneurial 
narratives reduce the appearance of uncertainty to external stakeholders, encouraging 
investment at the margin (Shane and Cable 2002; Smith and Anderson 2004). Stories 
provide a link for shared sense-making between the entrepreneurs and the stakeholders 
(Martens et al. 2007). In this framework, the video pitch and text narrative provided by 
the entrepreneur would appear to be the primary tools for conveying a compelling 
narrative. Potential investors are attracted to projects that appear likely to succeed 
(Mollick 2014). 
Crowdfunding enables entrepreneurs to facilitate organisational legitimacy 
primarily through cultural entrepreneurship activities rather than via demonstrated 
resource configurations. In contrast to the traditional venture capital market, 
crowdfunding leverages interactive ICT features to create a dynamic environment that 
could nurture and build organisational legitimacy.  
Using crowdfunding mechanisms, entrepreneurs are able to construct storylines that 
communicates static information but also establishes an interactive narrative through 
specific online related features such as visual updates and synchronous and 
asynchronous textual communication.  We anticipate verifying Reuber and Fischer’s 
(2005) idea that active engagement facilitates ventures establishing organisational 
legitimacy with their customers, leveraging cultural dynamics inside online 
communities to support capital assembly. 
4 Research design and data 
This study seeks to link specific features of reward-based crowdfunding platforms with 
organisational legitimacy creation and successful crowdfunding outcomes.  We apply an 
explorative empirical research method.  Research on crowdfunding is relatively new, so 
our focus is on identifying patterns and potential causal relationships to generate 
preliminary conclusions and advance further study (Cornelius et al. 2006; Blaikie 
(2011). 
We analyse the dynamics and particular features in crowdfunding, contributing 
towards knowledge of entrepreneurial legitimacy creation in reward-based 
crowdfunding.  Whilst we present data that has been subject to statistical analysis, we 
use it not to validate a hypothesis, instead given that this is an emergent area of research 
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we discuss the issues arising out of the data from an organisational legitimacy 
perspective triangulating with existing theory to develop new (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Our exploratory analysis draws upon dataset derived from Kickstarter (2014), a 
successful crowdfunding platform established in 2009 that employs ICT features 
facilitating entrepreneurial organisational legitimacy construction and resource 
exchange and is the leading reward-based crowdfunding platform.  According to 
Kickstarter’s statistics 136,000 projects were launched using Kickstarter since 2009, 
reporting an investment volume of US$1 billion and a community of circa 5.7 million 
individual backers (Kickstarter Statistics 2014).  In terms of crowdfunding success rate, 
Kickstarter reports that around 57,500 projects were successful (42.3%) in their 
financial capital assembly, capturing an investment volume of US$867 million (86.7% 
of the total investment volume).  Approximately 74,500 projects (54.8%) were 
unsuccessfully funded with a total investment size of US$118 million, representing 
11.8% of the total investment volume of Kickstarter (Kickstarter Statistics 2014).2 
4.1 Data collection 
We used a web data extraction method to capture detailed data from the Kickstarter 
website, similar to other crowdfunding studies (Mollick’s 2014).  Web data extraction 
facilitates the collection of relatively large datasets with high levels of data validity 
because the site is in active use and the data generated specifically for web-based 
transmission (Kosala and Blockeel 2000; Thelwall 2001; Chang et al. 2006). 
We were able to capture activities on all projects listed on Kickstarter in New York 
between June and July 2012 having chosen New York since it originates 13.5% of all 
US Kickstarter crowdfunding and 11.9% of all global Kickstartercrowdfunding projects 
(Kickstarter 2014).  This dataset allows us to explore Kickstarter’s diversity and enables 
us to generalize our findings to the Kickstarter population.  By collecting variables such 
as the project-funding target, number of backers, the reward-level structure, and other 
project related data we are able to provide a first attempt to study entrepreneurial 
practices in the development of organisational legitimacy and capital assembly in 
reward-based crowdfunding. The data sample represents 421 projects and captures an 
investment volume of US$3,514,125 provided by 44,578 backers. 
4.2 Variables 
Here we detail and justify the variables featuring in our study, which we chose as (1) 
projects required to provide information variables, and (2) they represent potential 
organisational legitimacy criteria as those variables are publicly observable and thus 
likely to influence crowdfunding efforts. 
Funding target:  Every crowdfunding project requires a funding target, which represents 
the amount of financial capital that project creators or entrepreneurs seek to assemble.  
On Kickstarter, entrepreneurs only receive the assembled financial capital when the 
funding target is achieved - the threshold crowdfunding model. 
Final funding:  The total amount of funds that the project collected between the starting 
date and the designated end date of the crowdfunding campaign.  Reporting a final 
funding lower than the funding target means an unsuccessful effort.  The final funding 
amount may be larger than the funding target, indicating that the respective 
crowdfunding project is overfunded. 
Funding ratio:  The funding ratio denotes the percentage of the funding target achieved 
at the end date of the crowdfunding campaign. 
                                                
2 The provided percentages do not equal 100% as numbers were rounded. 
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Backers:  Individuals who financially support a project through Kickstarter represent 
the number of backers per project. 
Funding per backer:  Financial support per backer calculated as the final funding 
amount divided by the number of backers where high funding per backer indicates a 
project attracting less backers transacting a higher financial support.  Argumentum e 
contrario, project creators were successful in communicating organisational legitimacy 
to stimulate backers to perform higher financial injections into the project. 
Duration:  The period of time (days) which projects can receive financial support from 
backers, which at Kickstarter is a maximum of 60 days. 
Reward-level:  The number of different reward-levels from which backers can select to 
financially support a project.  Reward-levels are created and defined by project creators. 
Every project has a minimum of one reward-level with no maximum.  Each reward-
level will be given a predetermined price (maximum of US$10.000 on Kickstarter) and 
a specific configuration of intangible or tangible qualities. 
Visual pitch:  In addition to a textual pitch, projects can implement videos.  This 
variable represents a dummy variable, where dummy = 1 if a crowdfunding project has 
a video. 
Founding team composition:  Crowdfunding projects provide additional information 
about the project creator in form of a user profile.  This variable explores whether a 
project was created by an individual or by a team and categorises the number and 
composition of the founding team. 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
  Successful 
Variables N Min p25 Mean p75 Max SD 
Funding Target ($) 227 100.00 2500.00 9460.61 10,000.00 100,000.00 14,132.11 
Final Funding ($) 227 100.00 3101.00 12,903.67 11,920.00 287,342.00 26,228.73 
Funding Ratio (%) 227 100.00 103.76 133.31 133.89 953.50 79.85 
#Backers 227 5 40 170 140 4242 374 
Funding/Backer ($) 227 15 49 88 98 729 73 
#Duration 227 8 30 33 36 60 11 
#Video No 21             
Yes 206             
#Reward-Levels 227 2 7 9 10 32 4 
  Failed 
Funding Target ($) 177 57.00 5000.00 31,840.86 30,000.00 1,000,000.00 82,803.79 
Final Funding ($) 177 0.00 45.00 3244.36 2631.00 53,422.00 8082.12 
Funding Ratio (%) 177 0.00 .46 12.04 17.00 82.57 17.02 
#Backers 177 0 1 33 29 515 72 
Funding/Backer ($) 177 0 23 74 97 1007 104 
#Duration 177 10 30 37 45 60 13 
#Video No 33             
Yes 144             
#Reward-Levels 177 1 6 9 10 33 5 
  Cancelled 
Funding Target ($) 17 1500.00 5000.00 28,794.12 50,000.00 124,000.00 36,920.97 
Final Funding ($) 17 0.00 100.00 631.82 775.00 4550.00 1083.96 
Funding Ratio (%) 17 0.00 .88 5.84 3.86 56.88 13.51 
#Backers 17 0 2 9 14 37 9 
Funding/Backer ($) 17 0 24 61 89 228 60 
#Duration 17 21 30 37 41 60 11 
#Video No 2             
Yes 15             
#Reward-Levels 17 1 7 9 11 16 4 
  Total 
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Funding Target ($) 421 57.00 3000.00 19,650.57 15,000.00 1,000,000.00 56,166.83 
Final Funding ($) 421 0.00 360.00 8347.09 7647.00 287,342.00 20,547.55 
Funding Ratio (%) 421 0.00 4.50 77.18 112.49 953.50 85.19 
#Backers 421 0 7 106 96 4242 287 
Funding/Backer ($) 421 0 38 81 97 1007 87 
#Duration 421 8 30 35 40 60 12 
#Video No 56             
Yes 365             
#Reward-Levels 421 1 6 9 10 33 4 
From the total sample of 421 projects, 227 projects (53.9%) successfully achieved their 
funding target, 177 projects (42%) were unsuccessful and 17 projects (4%) were 
cancelled before they reached the official end date (Table 1).  Success rate in the sample 
is about 10% higher than the official Kickstarter statistics (Kickstarter Statistics 2014).  
The sample exhibits a strong deviation in terms of project’s funding target in reward-
based crowdfunding, with a minimum funding target in our sample of US$57, and the 
maximum funding target of US$1,000,000.  The average funding target for our sample 
size is US$19,650.  The average final funding is US$8,347.  The largest project 
achieved a final funding of US$287,342.  The average number of backers for projects is 
106 individual backers.  The largest backer number for a crowdfunding project is 4242.  
The samples average funding per backer is US$81.27. 
5 Findings 
5.1 Funding target and final funding 
Successful projects tend to have a much lower funding target (US$9,415) in comparison 
to unsuccessful (US$32,002) and cancelled (US$30,281) projects (Table 1).  However, 
the mean final funding for successful projects is US$12,807, hence, successful projects 
tend to get over-funded by 32.6% on average.  Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the 
sample plotted against projects funding target and funding ratio showing that the density 
of projects lie in the funding area between 100 – 150% for successful projects and 
between 0 – 25% for unsuccessful projects.  The mean funding ratio value for 
successful projects is 133.31% whilst for unsuccessful and cancelled projects the 
funding ratio illustrates that projects fail by large margin, with mean values of 12.04% 
and 5.84% respectively. 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
Figure 1. Scatter plot - Funding target and Funding Ratio. 
 
Figure 2 exemplifies the frequency of successful, unsuccessful and cancelled projects 
for each category group and demonstrates that projects from the Music and Theatre 
category expose by far more successful than unsuccessful crowdfunding efforts.  The 
data reveals that most reward-based crowdfunding projects come from the Film (117), 
Music (66), Theater (66), Publishing (46) and Art (37) categories and demonstrate that 
reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter are exploited by 
entrepreneurs that are aiming to explore ‘new ways to raise funds for creative projects’ 
(Kickstarter 2014).  In fact, the total investment for projects from the two categories 
Film (US$1,425,480) and Publishing (US$492,010) count for 54.6% of the samples 
investment volume. 
 
Figure 2 about here. 
Figure 2. Histogram - Funding outcome per project categories. 
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5.2 Funding period 
Surprisingly we find no significant difference between successful and unsuccessful 
crowdfunding projects fundraising duration (Table 1) with an average campaign days 
for unsuccessful projects at 37 and for successful projects 33 days. 
We assumed that projects with a higher funding target have a higher chance to 
successfully assemble the required capital through a longer funding period.  However, 
our data suggests that the combination of a high funding target and a long funding 
period (which is understood as any funding period above the mean value) are associated 
with less successful crowdfunding efforts.  Vice versa, our explorative data suggests 
that shorter campaign periods seem to be related to a higher success rate.  Yet, Figure 3 
illustrates a low degree of correlation between the project duration and the funding ratio. 
 
Figure 3 about here. 
Figure 3. Scatter plot project duration and funding ratio. 
 
Kickstarter suggests campaign durations of 30 days: ‘Statistically, projects lasting 30 
days or less have our highest success rate’ (Kickstarter School 2014).  Comparing the 
project duration among the various categories, we do not observe significant differences 
among them (Appendix 1).  However, the mean values of the project duration are 
distributed around the suggested 30 days project period. 
5.3 Reward-level structure 
It is not possible to draw clear conclusions causally linking reward-level to success.  
Whilst we observe that the average number of reward-levels seem to be relatively 
similar for successful and unsuccessful projects, we deduced that creatively-oriented 
projects (e.g. art, design and publishing) have a higher number of reward-levels  
(Figure 4; Appendix 1). 
 
Figure 4 about here. 
Figure 4. Histogram Reward-levels for project categories. 
5.4 Visual pitch 
In additional to a textual presentation, often a business plan, crowdfunding platforms 
allow project initiators to include visual presentation. Most crowdfunding platforms 
facilitate the use of a video recorded pitch. In our dataset, 365 projects, representing 
86.7% of the sample, incorporated a visual pitch in their crowdfunding campaign  
(Table 1; Appendix 1).  206 of these projects were successfully funded (56%).  
Kickstarter encourages the project initiator to use video: ‘[…] a video is by far the best 
way to get a feel for the emotions, motivations, and character of a project.  It’s a 
demonstration of effort and a good predictor of success’ (Kickstarter School 2014).   
Our data suggests the fact that a visual pitch is far from being a guarantee of 
success.  Of the 227 successful projects, 206 projects (90.75%) had a visual pitch; 
81.26% of failed projects also had a visual presentation (144 of 177 failing projects).  A 
visual pitch has thus become standard, challenging the idea that using visual pitches 
predicts success. 
5.5 Founding team composition 
Table 2 reports summarises data on the founding team composition of the crowdfunding 
projects team showing that 320 projects (76%) were created by individual entrepreneurs 
and only 36 crowdfunding projects (8.55%) had an entrepreneurial team, with 
established organisations creating 65 funding projects (15.44%). 
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Table 2. Summary statistics - founding team composition. 
    All Successful Failed 
Composition # % # % # % 
Single Female  93 22.1 64 68.8 29 31.2 Male 227 53.9 104 45.8 123 54.2 
Pair 
Female  9 2.1 7 70.0 2 30.0 
Male 13 3.1 9 69.2 4 30.8 
Mix 10 2.4 5 50.0 5 50.0 
Three 
Female  1 0.2 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Male - - - - - - 
Mix 1 0.2 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Four 
Female  - - - - - - 
Male 1 0.2 1 100.0 0 0.0 
Mix 1 0.2 1 100.0 0 0.0 
  Organisation 65 15.4 34 52.3 31 47.7 
Total 421 100 227 53.9 194 46.1 
 
The numbers are too small to draw firm conclusions, however, in traditional venture 
capital a balanced team (technical, financial, sales, operational expertise) is a clear 
predictor of success: none of the projects with teams failed (4 in number) and those with 
pairs of entrepreneurs (numbering 32) succeeded more than those with individuals 
(320).  This suggests that in addition to evaluating the business idea, investors are look 
at the capability of the entrepreneur(s) to deliver the plan. 
6 Discussion 
Crowdfunding is of increasing significance to policy-makers and venturesome 
businesses caught in the funding gap facing many small and high-risk startups.  How far 
the crowdfunding model will grow and internationalise is as yet unclear.  Also unclear 
is the extent to which the model might disrupt traditional venture capital.  Reward-based 
crowdfunding provides investors with the opportunity to invest relative small amounts 
in businesses to which they have subjective attachment in addition to gaining reward; 
they also have the opportunity to participate in online communities, which may shape 
the nature of proposed business propositions.  For entrepreneurs, crowdfunding is a new 
way of marshalling capital resources, learning from the wisdom of crowds and/or 
creating a market for a nascent business. 
We have explored the reward-based crowdfunding mechanism from a cultural 
entrepreneurship perspective providing tentative explanations of how particular features 
of crowdfunding process influence organisational legitimacy and success and failure in 
reward-based crowdfunding.  The data reveals findings linking project characteristics to 
legitimacy and success. 
Funding target and final funding 
Our data suggests that the funding targets are associated with the creation of 
organisational legitimacy creation: a high funding target implies more effort is required 
by the project creator or entrepreneur to legitimate the requested funding.  Accordingly, 
it seems important for project initiators to be transparent and persuasive about the 
funding goal.  We support Achleitner et al. (2013) and Sievers (2013) conclusion that 
crowdfunding and traditional venture capital both require detailed, internally consistent 
and market-referencing business plans to achieve legitimacy, though high funding 
targets decrease organisational legitimacy without a convincing justification of source 
and use of funds. 
We agree with Reuber and Fischer (2011) and Zhang and Liu (2012) that herding 
behaviour is influential in online communities’ supporting pitches, since the openness 
of interactivity on crowdfunding platforms allows others note comments and feedback 
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and to follow the herd.  Crowdfunding platforms may reinforce this behaviour by 
introducing popularity data, short-listing of projects and staff-picks, all of which serve 
herding by narrowing choices.  Ward and Ramachandran’s (2010) finding reveals a 
positive correlation between the listing on a popularity list and successful achievement 
of the funding target exists.  The funding ratio values in our data illustrate that 
crowdfunding projects succeed by relatively small margins but fail by large margin, 
suggesting a dynamic that success amplifies success analogous to Mollick’s (2014) 
findings.  Interestingly, this finding is quite different from traditional venture capital 
processes where successful entrepreneurial resource assembly is usually realised by 
large margins and profitable ventures or projects tend to be heavily over-funded.  One 
reason for that is that sophisticated investors have the knowledge and managerial skills 
to exploit good investment opportunities.  In contrast, potential investors in 
communities such as crowdfunding appear to rely more on group dynamics and 
interactive entrepreneurial narrative activities in terms of investment choices, which 
lead to narrowed choices. 
However, Burtch et al. (2011, 11) highlight how community driven popularity 
indicators might negatively influence the overall funding outcome, as ‘higher 
contribution frequencies are associated with lower subsequent contribution amounts, as 
are lower contribution densities.’  Although, Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) illustrate that the 
long tail hypotheses (Anderson 2004) is valid in product sales through digital 
environments, it seems that the implemented popularity indicators on crowdfunding 
platforms do diminish the effect of the long tail phenomenon in online crowdfunding 
platforms, distributing financial capital into more likely succeeding projects.  As result 
successful projects tend to be over-funded as such mechanism seem to influence the 
organisational legitimacy creation.  Community behaviour, therefore, might be a 
stronger indicator for organisational legitimacy rather than narrative legitimacy factors 
such as the funding target variable. 
Crowdfunding duration 
Our data illustrates that projects with higher funding targets tend to have longer funding 
durations.  However, the data suggest that longer fundraising periods lead to lower 
funding ratio values.  Based from an organisational legitimacy perspective, we can 
assume that a longer fundraising period might expose an uncertain narrative for the 
project, resulting in decreasing support for the project. 
An explanation for that result can be deduced from the importance of project 
momentum for organisational legitimacy creation within reward-based crowdfunding 
platforms.  As Ward and Ramachandran (2010) illustrate, projects have increased 
challenges to effectively build and maintain project momentum the longer their funding 
period is.  In highly heterogeneous and dynamic communities such as crowdfunding 
platforms, attention for specific projects seems to diminish with time.  Apparently it is 
more efficient to implement a shorter funding period as projects seem to go relatively 
quickly out of support with the crowdfunding community (Ward and Ramachandran 
2010).  Kickstarter states that ‘shorter projects set a tone of confidence and help 
motivate your backers to join the party. Longer durations incite less urgency, encourage 
procrastination, and tend to fizzle out’ (Kickstarter School 2014). 
Reward-level structure 
While the data did not provide clear implications of the relationship of the reward-level 
structure and successful crowdfunding efforts, we identified that creative projects tend 
to incorporate a higher number of reward-levels.  Projects from creative categories seem 
to have a better ability to implement mixed intangible/tangible rewards.  This allows 
project initiators to incorporate additional reward-levels in order to include 
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supplementary social-psychological investment incentives.  The possibility to create 
rewards in any kind of tangible or intangible form establishes a key feature of  
reward-based crowdfunding.  Therefore, rewards create a key driver for activities within 
the community and create strong narrative legitimacy factors.  We argue that the 
reward-levels demonstrate an important factor that makes a project compelling to the 
audience.  Burtch et al. (2011) suggest that projects that are positioned with their 
product or service in trending and popular content of the broader internet, are more 
likely to receive higher contribution from the community.  Kickstarter (2014) highlights 
the influence of the right rewards for successful crowdfunding efforts and states that 
‘the importance of creative, tangible, and fairly priced rewards cannot be overstated. 
Projects whose rewards are overpriced or uninspired struggle to find support’.  
Therefore, it seems those projects that are able to offer additional social-psychological 
reward-levels are more successful to motivate the community for financial support. 
Visual pitch 
The large majority of projects in our data included a visual pitch in their crowdfunding 
campaign.  Unlike previous studies, which understand visual pitches in crowdfunding 
projects as quality signals, we argue that visual elements in crowdfunding pitches 
appeared to developed into a crowdfunding standard and therefore weakened its 
controlling character to predict success in reward-based crowdfunding.  While the 
measurement of visual pitches is not adequate to predict success, we however 
understand visual pitches from the cultural entrepreneurship perspective as a powerful 
entrepreneurial narrative instrument. 
Clarke (2011) highlights the importance of visual communication and the use of 
visual symbols to increase organisational legitimacy and develop support for nascent 
ventures.  Visual pitches support entrepreneurs to attain support and funding for their 
projects and allow entrepreneurs to actively create and manage emotions of stakeholders 
(Clarke 2011).  As more projects utilise the power of visual pitches to persuade the 
community to financially support the project, the findings emphasise a more  
social-psychological rather than rational business oriented organisational legitimacy 
creation process in reward-based crowdfunding.  
Founding’ team composition 
The composition and characteristics of the founding team in entrepreneurial ventures 
play an important role for organisational legitimacy and resource assembly processes 
(Kotha and George 2012; Zhao et al. 2013). Shepherd and Zacharakis (2003) illustrate 
that organisational legitimacy can be built by providing additional information of the 
organisation and management team of the entrepreneurial venture.  Research has 
illustrated that information about the founding team represent a critical factor of 
traditional venture capital investment-decision making processes (Zimmerman and Zeitz 
2002; Baum und Silverman 2004).  It appears that investors in reward-based 
crowdfunding look at the team composition as well in evaluating the business idea.  The 
data shows that the majority of the sample projects were created by individual 
entrepreneurs (76%), followed by organisations (15.4%), pairs (7.6%) and teams 
(0.5%).  Projects with pairs and teams demonstrate much higher success rates than 
projects with individuals. Most interestingly, however, is that projects created by 
females experienced a higher success rate than males. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have contributed to crowdfunding literature referencing the results of 
an empirical study that is explorative and descriptive in nature.  This study illustrates 
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that cultural entrepreneurship activities play a significant role in creating online 
organisational legitimacy and links specific features to successful crowdfunding efforts.  
While this study offers additional understanding of some dynamics that take place in 
crowdfunding and can be associated with organisational legitimacy, research on 
crowdfunding is still limited and further research is required. 
The possibilities for entrepreneurs to facilitate the collective development of a 
business idea establish an interesting research issue linked to co-creation.  It appears 
that a distinctive feature of reward-based crowdfunding is the joint effort to develop and 
promote a business idea rather than primarily evaluating a business plan.  It is important 
that future research focuses on the co-creation possibilities and its impact on the 
organisational legitimacy and resource assembly process.  Further, our dataset revealed 
that women experience a higher success rate than males.  This presents a fascinating 
area for future study; given the high male-to-female ratio generally present in both 
entrepreneur and investor populations. 
Overall, further crowdfunding research is necessary as current studies are outcome 
oriented and utilise quantitative methods to explain specific patterns in crowdfunding.  
Current knowledge lacks understanding of the business processes that are associated 
with crowdfunding outcome.  It is important to move crowdfunding research into more 
qualitative research methods to provide deeper understanding of specific entrepreneurial 
activities and processes.  Moreover, qualitative research would enable to capture a 
broader picture of the crowdfunding phenomena and allow to link offline activities with 
online processes.  It is important to disclose offline activities to understand online 
crowdfunding processes and outcomes as our current understanding is built on 
knowledge that originates from activities on online crowdfunding platforms.  While this 
paper focuses on specific variables that are captured of crowdfunding projects, further 
work is required to analyse more qualitative features of crowdfunding project pitches 
such as textual and visual pitches.  Such future studies will allow us to extend 
knowledge about the organisational legitimacy creation of crowdfunding projects in 
terms of entrepreneurial narrative. 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive statistics on project categories. 
  
  Total Successful Failed Cancelled 
Variables  Min   Mean   Max  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  
A
rt
 (N
 =
 3
7)
 
FundingTarget ($) 57.00 40,799.65 1,000,000.00 18 6,485.00 18 77,186.50 1 3,500.00 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 7,034.27 53,422.00 18 7,782.33 18 6,662.00 1 270.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 67.83 171.70 18 122.58 18 16.42 1 7.71 
#Backers 0.00 69.32 317.00 18 102.11 18 40.28 1 2.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 89.43 250.00 18 78.89 18 97.44 1 135.00 
Duration 10.00 31.73 60.00 18 29.33 18 34.22 1 30.00 
#RewardLevels 2.00 9.41 30.00 18 9.17 18 9.61 1 10.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   1  5  0  
   17  13  1  
C
om
ic
s (
N
 =
 7
) 
FundingTarget ($) 3,000.00 10,142.86 27,000.00 4 6,125.00 3 15,500.00 0 - 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 6,048.71 21,372.00 4 9,659.50 3 1,234.33 0 - 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 84.06 213.72 4 143.42 3 4.92 0 - 
#Backers 0.00 207.14 962.00 4 351.75 3 14.33 0 - 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 37.46 90.08 4 34.71 3 41.14 0 - 
Duration 20.00 33.86 45.00 4 35.50 3 31.67 0 - 
#RewardLevels 6.00 13.86 32.00 4 16.25 3 10.67 0 - 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   0  1  0  
   4  2  0  
D
an
ce
 (N
 =
 1
0)
 
FundingTarget ($) 2,000.00 6,750.00 16,700.00 9 7,166.67 1 3,000.00 0 - 
FinalFunding ($) 511.00 8,585.70 31,028.00 9 9,482.89 1 511.00 0 - 
FundingRatio (%) 17.03 111.14 258.57 9 121.59 1 17.03 0 - 
#Backers 9.00 63.70 153.00 9 69.78 1 9.00 0 - 
Funding/Backer ($) 40.69 121.84 294.12 9 129.07 1 56.78 0 - 
Duration 13.00 31.00 55.00 9 28.33 1 55.00 0 - 
#RewardLevels 5.00 6.90 9.00 9 7.00 1 6.00 0 - 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   1  0  0  
   8  1  0  
D
es
ig
n 
(N
 =
 1
8)
 
FundingTarget ($) 300.00 51,945.56 275,000.00 5 26,360.00 12 62,768.33 1 50,000.00 
FinalFunding ($) 375.00 18,432.78 135,002.00 5 35,346.40 12 12,843.58 1 935.00 
FundingRatio (%) 1.87 53.67 158.26 5 134.85 12 24.16 1 1.87 
#Backers 7.00 286.61 2,279.00 5 645.40 12 159.67 1 16.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 30.57 80.58 200.69 5 49.30 12 95.46 1 58.44 
Duration 30.00 37.00 60.00 5 39.40 12 36.17 1 35.00 
#RewardLevels 4.00 10.33 28.00 5 7.60 12 11.58 1 9.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   1  2  0  
   4  10  1  
Fa
sh
io
n 
(N
 =
 2
6)
 
FundingTarget ($) 1,000.00 10,365.38 100,000.00 5 6,600.00 20 11,325.00 1 10,000.00 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 6,961.77 128,722.00 5 31,932.80 20 1,062.10 1 100.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 69.36 953.50 5 332.12 20 7.09 1 1.00 
#Backers 0.00 93.46 1,181.00 5 419.20 20 16.65 1 1.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 76.17 500.00 5 63.54 20 78.13 1 100.00 
Duration 15.00 31.73 50.00 5 31.00 20 32.00 1 30.00 
#RewardLevels 3.00 9.19 33.00 5 10.20 20 9.20 1 4.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   1  7  0  
   4  13  1  
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  Total Successful Failed Cancelled 
Variables  Min   Mean   Max  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  
Fi
lm
 ( 
= 
11
7)
 
FundingTarget ($) 100.00 28,230.16 200,000.00 60 17,741.77 55 38,353.15 2 64,500.00 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 12,183.59 124,114.00 60 20,577.03 55 3,461.24 2 245.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 67.58 350.00 60 120.77 55 11.94 2 1.96 
#Backers 0.00 125.81 1,976.00 60 216.18 55 31.42 2 10.50 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 99.73 1,006.62 60 113.01 55 87.95 2 25.49 
Duration 10.00 37.36 60.00 60 34.60 55 40.25 2 40.50 
#RewardLevels 3.00 9.74 31.00 60 10.22 55 9.15 2 12.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   2  2  0  
   58  53  2  
Fo
od
 (N
 =
 3
) 
FundingTarget ($) 5,000.00 10,666.67 20,000.00 3 10,666.67 0 - 0 - 
FinalFunding ($) 8,212.00 13,379.67 21,777.00 3 13,379.67 0 - 0 - 
FundingRatio (%) 108.89 139.38 164.24 3 139.38 0 - 0 - 
#Backers 75.00 193.67 272.00 3 193.67 0 - 0 - 
Funding/Backer ($) 30.19 86.19 135.33 3 86.19 0 - 0 - 
Duration 30.00 30.00 30.00 3 30.00 0 - 0 - 
#RewardLevels 8.00 12.00 19.00 3 12.00 0 - 0 - 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   0  0  0  
   3  0  0  
G
am
es
 (N
 =
 8
) 
FundingTarget ($) 600.00 30,889.00 100,000.00 2 14,750.00 4 50,653.00 2 7,500.00 
FinalFunding ($) 1.00 5,202.63 15,081.00 2 14,826.00 4 2,669.25 2 646.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.16 28.84 100.54 2 100.52 4 3.94 2 6.95 
#Backers 1.00 102.88 435.00 2 286.00 4 52.50 2 20.50 
Funding/Backer ($) 1.00 39.70 106.36 2 70.52 4 30.00 2 28.28 
Duration 30.00 33.63 41.00 2 32.00 4 33.50 2 35.50 
#RewardLevels 7.00 10.38 15.00 2 10.00 4 10.25 2 11.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   0  0  0  
   2  4  2  
M
us
ic
 (N
 =
 6
6)
 
FundingTarget ($) 500.00 7,552.95 100,000.00 43 4,652.19 20 13,147.55 3 11,833.33 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 3,710.74 13,327.00 43 5,339.63 20 739.45 3 172.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 83.69 342.00 43 123.61 20 10.06 3 2.34 
#Backers 0.00 48.68 221.00 43 70.33 20 8.70 3 5.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 71.40 270.27 43 84.43 20 48.69 3 36.17 
Duration 8.00 36.03 60.00 43 34.84 20 38.10 3 39.33 
#RewardLevels 2.00 8.27 22.00 43 8.23 20 8.10 3 10.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   5  9  0  
   38  11  3  
Ph
ot
og
ra
ph
y 
(N
 =
 1
4)
 
FundingTarget ($) 500.00 11,971.43 55,000.00 4 9,150.00 7 7,714.29 3 25,666.67 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 3,665.21 16,935.00 4 10,784.50 7 1,062.14 3 246.67 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 41.66 172.72 4 132.91 7 6.72 3 1.52 
#Backers 0.00 44.21 223.00 4 122.75 7 17.00 3 3.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 52.80 145.99 4 87.17 7 39.46 3 38.13 
Duration 25.00 36.57 60.00 4 40.00 7 32.43 3 41.67 
#RewardLevels 3.00 7.93 14.00 4 10.00 7 6.29 3 9.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   0  0  1  
   4  7  2  
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  Total Successful Failed Cancelled 
Variables  Min   Mean   Max  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  
Pu
bl
is
hi
ng
 (N
 =
 4
6)
 
FundingTarget ($) 120.00 14,771.63 100,000.00 20 7,821.25 23 15,437.83 3 56,000.00 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 10,695.87 287,342.00 20 22,721.50 23 1,355.74 3 2,132.67 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 78.15 718.36 20 167.74 23 7.86 3 19.75 
#Backers 0.00 174.72 4,242.00 20 380.20 23 17.00 3 14.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 67.75 416.44 20 80.70 23 47.20 3 139.00 
Duration 10.00 33.33 60.00 20 33.20 23 34.26 3 27.00 
#RewardLevels 1.00 7.48 18.00 20 8.55 23 6.26 3 9.67 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   4  7  1  
   16  16  2  
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
(N
 =
 3
) 
FundingTarget ($) 2,000.00 7,333.33 10,000.00 1 9,999.99 2 6,000.00 0 - 
FinalFunding ($) 30.00 3,358.33 10,000.00 1 10,000.00 2 37.50 0 - 
FundingRatio (%) 0.45 33.98 100.00 1 100.00 2 0.98 0 - 
#Backers 1.00 78.67 233.00 1 233.00 2 1.50 0 - 
Funding/Backer ($) 22.50 31.81 42.92 1 42.92 2 26.25 0 - 
Duration 15.00 31.67 45.00 1 45.00 2 25.00 0 - 
#RewardLevels 4.00 7.00 9.00 1 9.00 2 6.00 0 - 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   0  0  0  
   1  2  0  
T
he
at
er
 (N
 =
 6
6)
 
FundingTarget ($) 100.00 7,131.11 100,000.00 53 4,678.36 12 18,433.33 1 1,500.00 
FinalFunding ($) 0.00 4,656.30 40,903.00 53 5,416.72 12 1,685.83 1 0.00 
FundingRatio (%) 0.00 108.39 304.00 53 129.92 12 22.33 1 0.00 
#Backers 0.00 62.24 269.00 53 72.40 12 22.58 1 0.00 
Funding/Backer ($) 0.00 77.08 410.00 53 73.96 12 97.30 1 0.00 
Duration 12.00 33.29 60.00 53 31.06 12 41.42 1 54.00 
#RewardLevels 1.00 7.58 16.00 53 7.55 12 8.25 1 1.00 
#Video No 
            Yes 
   6  0  0  
   47  12  1  
 
